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Abstract We analyze the properties of a three-sector network economy character-
ized by credit relationships connecting downstream and upstream firms (inside credit)
and credit relationships connecting firms and banks (outside credit). The network
topology changes over time due to an endogenous process of partner selection (the
preferred-partner choice rule). The output of simulations shows that a business cycle
at the macroeconomic level can develop as a consequence of the complex interaction
of the heterogeneous financial conditions of the agents involved. In this paper we focus
on the emergence of bankruptcy crises: the bankruptcy of one agent can bring about
the bankruptcy of one or more other agents in a snowball effect of more or less large
size, depending on the network structure and the incidence of non-performing loans
on balance sheets of agents involved.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the properties of a credit-network economy in which a multi-
tude of heterogeneous agents interact giving rise to complex patterns of productive and
credit relationships. The amplitude of business fluctuations is related to the network
topology emerging from an endogenous process of partner selection. In particular, the
evolution of the credit network depends on a preferred-partner choice rule according
to which each agent selects the best partner in a limited set of observable partners due
to imperfect information.
In this framework, it is straightforward to think of agents as nodes and of debt
contracts as links in a credit network. Direct interaction—exemplified by debt con-
tracts—is the raison d’etre of the network. Indirect interaction, i.e. interaction through
“prices”–may still occur but does not necessarily lead to an equilibrium outcome,
because decentralized decision making is not governed by a benevolent auctioneer, a
pure figment of fantasy which we will get rid of in modelling the network.1
It is also straightforward to think of agents as intrinsically heterogeneous. Different
characteristics such as technological, informational and financial endowments, pref-
erences or expectations—to name just a few—can account for the role of lenders or
borrowers that agents can assume.
Central to this picture is information, not only about the status of the parties in a
credit relationship but also about the incentive structures that they face. The lender has
to assess the risk involved in extending credit to a specified borrower and his ability
and willingness to fulfill debt obligations. But information is asymmetric so that such
an assessment is at best incomplete: all the issues crucial to modelling borrowers’ and
lenders’ behaviour in an asymmetric information context are relevant also in designing
the network of credit relationships. In this context, a simple and easily available indi-
rect sign of the borrowers’ creditworthiness is a measure of their financial soundness
captured, for instance, by net worth.
In a credit relationship, a borrower may not be able to fulfill debt commitments,
either by misfortune or mismanagement. The bankruptcy of a borrower is irrelevant
if, so to speak, the agent is an “island”. In a networked economy, bankruptcy will not
be an isolated and therefore insignificant phenomenon. The bankruptcy of one agent
can bring about the bankruptcy of one or more other agents in a snowball effect of
more or less large size. In other words, in a credit network we can observe avalanches
of bankruptcies.
Building upon ideas expounded first in Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003, Chapter 7),
in Delli Gatti et al. (2006) we have modelled a credit network consisting of house-
holds, firms and banks. Agents are linked by inside credit (i.e. credit relationships
1 Recent books by Jackson (2008), Vega-Redondo (2007) and Goyal (2007) describe the frontier of the
research on economic networks. A growing literature has recently developed on the network analysis of
the interbank market; see, for instance, Allen and Gale (200); Freixas et al. (2000); Furfine (2003); Iori
et al. (2006); Nier et al. (2007). Boissay (2006) and Battiston et al. (2007), instead, focus on the trade-credit
relationships along the “supply chain”.
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connecting firms belonging to different layers of the same industry, the corporate
sector) and outside credit (i.e. credit relationships connecting agents belonging to dif-
ferent sectors, i.e. banks and firms). In that paper, however, the network is static, i.e.
its structure does not change over time. The specific contribution of the present paper
is the introduction of a mechanism for the endogenous evolution of the network struc-
ture, the preferred-partner choice rule which is defined as follows. In every period,
each customer search for the minimum of the prices charged by a randomly selected
set of suppliers; if the minimum price is lower than the price the customer paid to the
old supplier in the previous period, he will switch to the new supplier, otherwise he
will stick to the old supplier. In the jargon of the network literature, the number of links
connecting the nodes of the customers to a certain node of the suppliers changes over
time so that the topology of the network is also in a process of continuous evolution.2
In the credit network we consider households play the role of passive final consum-
ers. They spend their entire income purchasing consumption goods. The corporate
sector consists of two layers of firms. Downstream (D hereafter) firms produce con-
sumption goods, while upstream (U hereafter) firms supply intermediate inputs to D
firms. Banks extend credit to firms in both layers. D firms are pure borrowers: they
borrow from U firms (trade credit) and from banks (bank loans). Banks are pure lend-
ers: they lend to D and U firms. U firms are borrowers and lenders at the same time:
they borrow from banks and lend to D firms.
Lenders conceive the borrower’s net worth as a proxy of creditworthiness. Hence
credit extended is increasing with the borrowers’ net worth. Since the scale of produc-
tion of D firms is constrained only by the availability of funds, in the end, the supply
of consumption goods is increasing with net worth.
The net worth of D firms is the engine of growth and fluctuations in this economy.
The scale of activity of U firms, in fact, is determined by the production of D firms.
Changes in the D net worth, therefore, brings about changes in the same direction of U
production, profit and net worth. An unexpected shock to D revenues affect the credit
relationship between D firms and their U suppliers. Also banks are involved because
the interest rate that banks charge, are a function of borrowers’ net worth.
If the shock is large enough, the D firm may be unable to fulfill debt commitments
and go bankrupt. “Bad debt”, i.e. non-performing loans—affect the net worth of lend-
ers, who can react increasing the interest rate. The interest rate hike leads to more
bankruptcies and eventually to a bankruptcy chain: “the high rate of bankruptcy is a
cause of the high interest rate as much as a consequence of it” (Stiglitz and Greenwald,
2003, p. 145).
The endogenous evolution of credit interlinkages affects the extent of bankruptcies’
diffusion, because of the interdependence of firm and bank behaviours: the default of
one agent (e.g., a downstream firm) can cause the default of another agent by decreasing
2 Jackson (2005) distinguishes between a random graph approach to network formation, borrowed from
physics, and the game theoretic approach specifically designed to deal with economic networks. The former
is, in a sense, “mechanical”: networks formation is purely stochastic or the product of an ad hoc algorithm.
The latter focuses on “equilibrium” networks, where links are formed as a consequence of cost-benefit
analysis on the part of self-interested individuals. The approach followed in the present paper is half-way
between the two: the preferred partner choice rule allocates links to nodes as a consequence of the algorithm
that represents the search for the lowest price on the part of customers.
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its financial soundness (e.g., an upstream firm linked to the bankrupt downstream one)
and so on, depending on the number of links among agents (the default of an agent with
many links implies a high probability of bankruptcy diffusion across the network).
All in all, we consider four markets: consumption goods, intermediate goods, labour
and credit. “Quantities”, i.e. the amount of consumption and intermediate goods pro-
duced, labour employed and credit extended are not affected by “prices”. They depend,
instead, in a complicated way on the financial conditions of the agents involved.
In two of the markets, i.e. the markets for intermediate goods and for bank loans,
a preferred partner choice rule is applied. In these cases, the “prices” i.e. the interest
rate on trade credit and on bank loans—affect the number of clients of each seller—the
U firms and the banks, respectively—and therefore their profits and net worth.3
We study the properties of the network by means of simulations, which show that
a business cycle at the macroeconomic level can develop as a consequence of the
complex interaction of the agents’ financial conditions. In other words, statistical reg-
ularities emerge as a self-organised process at the aggregate level. At the same time,
the main facts of firms’ demography (such as power law distribution of firms’ size and
Laplace distribution of growth rates) emerge endogenously.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented and discussed in Sect. 2.
Section 3 is devoted to the discussion of the simulation results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We model a multi-sector economy in discrete time (t = 1, 2, . . . , T ) populated by a
multitude of heterogeneous agents. The economy consists of three sectors: a down-
stream sector consisting of I firms (labeled by the index i = 1, 2, . . . , I ), an upstream
sector with J firms ( j = 1, 2, . . . , J ) and a banking sector consisting of Z banks
(z = 1, 2, . . . , Z). In order to keep the analysis simple, the number of firms and of
banks is exogenous.4
There are two goods, a consumption good and an intermediate good. D firms pro-
duce a perishable consumption good using labor and intermediate goods. For simplicity
and as a first approximation to a more realistic setting, we assume that firms sell all the
output they produce at a stochastic price. In other words, households absorb completely
the supply of consumption goods. Therefore D firms do not hold inventories—either
voluntary or involuntary—of consumption goods.
U firms produce the intermediate good “on demand” with a technology that requires
only labor. Therefore U firms do not hold inventories of intermediate goods. We are
ruling out by construction the possibility of avalanches of output due to the mismatch
of demand and supply of intermediate goods along a supply chain à la (Bak et al. 1993).
The financial side of the economy is characterized by two lending relationships:
(i) downstream and upstream firms obtain credit from banks; (ii) downstream firms
buy intermediate goods from upstream firms by means of a commercial credit contract.
3 On the other markets prices are exogenous, random (in the case of consumption goods) or deterministic
(in the case of the labour market).
4 Since in our framework agents can leave the market due to bankruptcy, in order to preserve constancy of
the number of agents we have to apply a one-to-one replacement procedure. See below.
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The structure of the network of expenditure, production and credit relationships
evolves endogenously due to the decentralized interaction among agents, on the basis
of a simple incentive mechanism which we have labelled the preferred-partner choice:
in every period each D firm looks for the U firm with the lowest price of intermediate
goods; at the same time each firm searches for the bank with the lowest interest rate.
The core assumption of the model is that the scale of activity of the i th D firm at
time t, i.e. the level of production Yit —is an increasing concave function of its financial
robustness, captured by net worth Ait :
Yit = φAβi t (1)
where φ > 1, 0 < β < 1 are parameters, uniform across D firms. The equation above
represents the financially constrained output function.
There are (at least) two rationales for (1). First, it can be thought of as a simple
rule of thumb in a world in which (i) bounded rationality prevents the elaboration
of optimizing decision-making processes and (ii) asymmetric information between
borrowers and lenders yields a financing hierarchy in which net worth ranks first.
Alternatively one can think of equation (1) as the solution of an optimization prob-
lem on the part of the firm. According to Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) for instance
the problem of the form consists in maximizing expected profits E (πi ) net of bank-
ruptcy costs Ci weighted by the probability of bankruptcy i . From the definition
of profits follows that they are an increasing function of output Yi given net worth
Ai . Bankruptcy costs are assumed to be increasing with the firm’s size. Finally, from
the definition of the probability of bankruptcy, it turns out that it is increasing with
the scale of activity, given net worth. An increase of financial fragility, captured by a
reduction of net worth, brings about an increase of the probability of bankruptcy. In
the end the Greenwald–Stiglitz characterization of the problem of the firm is:
max
Yi
V (Yi ; Ai ) = E (π (Yi ; Ai )) − C (Yi ) (Yi ; Ai )
whose solution is
Yi = arg max V (Yi ; Ai ) = f (Ai ) (2)
with f ′ > 0. Equation (1) can be considered a linearization of (2). By construction, the
second interpretation of (1) is grounded on more stringent requirements of rationality
than those implicit in (i) above. However, it is still true that asymmetric information
yields a financing hierarchy as assumed in (ii). The concavity of the financially con-
strained output function captures the idea that an increase in the variance of financial
conditions brings about a reduction of average (and therefore aggregate) output.
For simplicity we assume that the production function of D firms is of the Leontief
type: Yi = min( 1δd Ni , 1γ Qi ) with δd > 0 and γ > 0. Therefore, D firms have the fol-
lowing labor and intermediate goods requirement functions: Nit = δdYit , Qit = γ Yit .
In the end, both the demand for labor and the demand for intermediate goods of
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downstream firms depend in a non-linear way on their financial conditions. Nit =
δdφA
β
i t , Qit = γφAβi t .
Final goods are sold at a stochastic price uit , that is a random variable uniformly
distributed in the interval (0, 2).5 We can provide the following rationale for this
apparently restrictive assumption. Let the demand of the i th commodity in period t be
d (uit , δi t+1) where uit is the relative price of the i th commodity and δi t is a stochastic
demand disturbance specific to the market in question. Let supply be sit . By assumption
sit is made up of the quantities produced by a “large number” of producers so that the
contribution of each firm to total supply is negligible. In equilibrium uit = f (δi t , sit )
i.e. the relative price is an increasing function of the demand disturbance, given the pre-
determined supply. If demand is sufficiently elastic, changes in supply do not affect
the relative price significantly so that the relative price is essentially an increasing
function of random demand. A high realization of uit can be thought of as a regime
of high demand which drives up the relative price of the commodity in question. In a
regime of low demand, the realization of uit turns out to be low and may push the firm
out of the market if it is “too low”, i.e. if it makes the net worth of the firm negative.
Upstream firms produce the intermediate good by means of a Leontief technology
which employs only labor: Q jt = 1δu N jt where δu > 0. For simplicity, we assume an
asymmetric structure of the D–U network: many D firms can be linked to a single U
firm but each D firm has only one supplier of intermediate goods.
In each period the supplier—say the j th firm—receives orders from a set of D
customers which will be denoted by  j . Since each D firm looks for the U firm with
the lowest price of intermediate goods, by construction the number of elements of  j
depends on the price p jt that the upstream firm charges to its customers: the lower the
price, the higher the number of downstream firms placing orders to the j th supplier
of intermediate goods.
The price the supplier is charging is defined as p jt = 1 + r jt where r jt is the
interest rate on trade credit. We assume that the level of r jt depends on the financial
condition of the upstream firm:
r jt = αA−αj t (3)
with α > 0. In words, the interest rate on commercial paper charged to each and every
D firm belonging to  j is decreasing with the financial soundness of the U firm. If
the U firm is in good shape from the financial point of view, it will be eager to extend
trade credit at more favourable terms to its D customers.
In principle, the interest rate on trade credit charged by the j th U firm should be
affected also by the financial conditions of the borrowers, i.e. of the D firms in the set
5 Following Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) (GS hereafter) we assume that firms sell all the output they
produce at a stochastic price. Undoubtedly, this is the source of an important idiosyncratic shock at the
firm-level which influences the whole economy due to a direct mechanism—via output volatility of down-
stream firms—and an indirect mechanism, i.e. the propagation of shocks through productive and credit
interlinkages. In our framework, as in GS, stochastic prices are the vehicle of idiosyncratic shocks at the
firm level. In our setting, however, the mechanism of propagation and amplification is richer than in GS
because shocks affecting downstream firms spread to connected agents in a networked-economy with bank
and trade credit.
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 j . In order to keep the framework as simple as possible, however, we have assumed
that asymmetric information prevents a correct assessment of the financial conditions
of the borrowers on the part of the lenders. Therefore the interest rate on trade credit
incorporates only the financial condition of the lender.
We can propose the following rationale for this assumption. In our framework, the
existence of trade credit is basically due to a transaction motive (Nilsen 2002). Firms
aim at extending market shares (when agents’ financial conditions allow to act in this
way). The increase of upstreams’ net worth produces a decrease of interest rates on
trade credit affecting aggregate credit conditions in a way similar to that characterizing
banks. In a sense, upstream firms use trade credit as a marketing strategy (Summers and
Wilson 2001). Like expenditures in advertising, commercial credit is an investment
that, by establishing a long-term relationship between the lender and the borrower,
yields a long term return (Nadiri 1969). In our setting, firms extend trade credit at
more favourable terms, increasing the likelihood of gaining new customers, when their
financial conditions are sound. Accordingly, our modelling choice is consistent with
an explanation based on trade credit as a ‘long-term investment’ aimed at achieving
new customers through applying more favourable commercial credit conditions.6
While the scale of production of D firms is financially constrained, i.e. it is deter-
mined by their degree of financial robustness—the scale of production of U firms is
demand constrained, i.e. it is determined by the demand of intermediate goods on
the part of D firms. Therefore, the financial conditions of the D firms are the driving
force also for the production of U firms. The more robust, on average, D firms, the
higher their scale of activity and the demand for labour and intermediate goods so
that the higher will be, on average, the scale of activity of U firms. For instance, the
demand of intermediate goods—and therefore the scale of production—of the j th U




i t and the demand for labor will be
N jt = δuγφ ∑i∈ j A
β
i t .
Firms face a financing hierarchy in which internal finance ranks first and bank loans
second. Therefore, by assumption, the financing gap, i.e. the difference between the
firm’s expenditures and internal finance, is filled by means of credit. For U firms, the
financing gap is the difference between the wage bill and net worth. As to D firms,
expenditures consists of wages and the cost of intermediate goods. In order to keep the
analysis as simple as possible, however, we assume that also for D firms the financing
gap is the difference between the wage bill and net worth. This means that the acquisi-
tion of intermediate goods can be financed by means of trade credit, not by bank loans.
Accordingly, the demand of credit is equal to Bxt = Wxt − Axt where Wxt = wNxt
is the firm’s wage bill (x = i for D firms, j for U firms). We assume that the real
6 According to Mateut and Mizen (2003), firms behaves like banks in extending credit to other firms, charg-
ing to borrowers an external finance premium due to collection costs, e.g. costly state verification (Boissay
2006). In this way, trade credit affects aggregate credit conditions in the economy. Mateut (2001) shows
that trade credit has an important role in the transmission of monetary policy, interacting with external
financing decision made by banks. There is then a finance motive underlying commercial credit (Nilsen
2002). Nevertheless, in our model, trade credit is not a substitute for bank credit: we do not model the
interplay between bank and trade credit (although this is a relevant aspect highlighted by the literature:
see, for instance, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), on commercial credit, and Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990), on the
interplay between commercial credit and credit rationing).
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wage w is constant and uniform across firms. By assumption, labour is abundant so
that firms do not face any labour shortage at the pre-determined real wage.
Self-financed firms, i.e. firms with a level of net worth sufficient to finance the wage
bill, do not demand credit. From the expression above follows that the demand for
credit of the i th D firm is
Bit = wNit − Ait = wδdφAβi t − Ait (4)
so that a D firm is self financed if it has net worth Ait ≥ Aˆ ≡ (wδdφ)
1
1−β .
As to U firms, the demand for credit of the j th U firm is
B jt = wN jt − A jt = wδuγφ
∑
i∈ j
Aβi t − A jt (5)
so that a U firm is self financed if it has net worth A jt ≥ Aˆ j ≡ wδuγφ ∑i∈ j A
β
i t .
The higher the net worth of D customers of the U firm, the less likely it is that the U
firm is self financed.
For simplicity, we assume an asymmetric structure of the firms-banks network:
many firms can be linked to a single bank but each firm has only one supplier of loans.
The set of customers of the zth bank will be denoted by z . We assume that each
bank has a certain degree of market power. Since each firm looks for the bank with
the lowest interest rate, by construction the number of elements of z depends on the
interest rate the bank charges to its customers: the lower the interest rate, the higher
the number of firms asking loans to the zth bank.
The zth bank adopts the following rule in setting the interest rate on loans to the
x th borrower (x = i for downstream, j for upstream):
r xzt = σ A−σzt + θ (lxt )θ (6)
where Azt is the net worth of the zth bank and lxt = Bxt/Axt is the leverage ratio of
the x th firm, σ and θ positive parameters. Accordingly, the interest rate on bank loans
is (i) decreasing with the financial soundness of the bank (proxied by the bank’s net
worth Azt ) and (ii) increasing with the firms’ leverage ratio.
The rationale of (i) is obvious: if the bank is in good shape from the financial point
of view, it will be eager to extend credit at more favourable terms. This is the case, for
instance, if the bank adopts a rule of thumb according to which the amount of loans
outstanding must be reduced if it is “too high” with respect to the bank’s own capital,
i.e. net worth.7 When net worth is “too low”, the bank pushes the interest rate up to
reduce the number of borrowers the demand for loans.



























If the interest rate goes down more borrowers will be attracted by the bank and more loans will be extended.
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As to (ii), we simply assume that the firm penalizes financially fragile firms. In
a sense, we adopt the principle according to which the interest rate charged by the
lender incorporates an external finance premium increasing with leverage and there-
fore inversely related to the borrower’s net worth.8
Notice that the leverage ratio of the i th D firm is
li t = Bit/Ait = wδd YitAit = wδdφA
−(1−β)
i t − 1 (7)
i.e., it is decreasing with net worth. Therefore, in the end, the interest rate charged by
the zth bank to the i th D firm will be:




i t − 1
)θ
(8)
i.e., it will be a decreasing function of the net worth of the bank and of the firm.
The situation is different in the case of U firms. The leverage is





Aβi t − 1 (9)
since Q jt = γφ ∑i∈ j A
β
i t as shown above. The leverage of the U firm is decreasing
with its own net worth but increasing with the net worth of the downstream customers.
The interest rate charged by the zth bank to the j th U firm will be:
r
j











i.e. it will be a decreasing function of the net worth of the bank and of the j-firm but
an increasing function of the net worth of the downstream customers.
Each D firm has a (productive and credit) relationship with an U firm. Initially, i.e.
at time t = 1, the network of firms is random, i.e. the links among D and U firms are
established at random. Therefore, for instance the D firm indexed by i (Di) ends up
linked to the U firm indexed by j0 (U j0). In each of the subsequent periods, the net-
work changes endogenously according to a preferred-partner choice rule (with noise)
which is defined as follows:
– with (a small) probability ε the D firm chooses a partner (i.e. a U supplier) at
random;
– with probability 1 − ε he looks at the prices of a randomly selected number—say
M—of U firms;
8 In a sense in our model the bank behaves as a lender in a Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) world
characterized by asimmetric information and costly state verification. See Bernanke et al. (1999) for a
comprehensive exposition of the approach.
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– if the minimum observed price—say the price of U j1—is lower than the price
of U j0,then Di will switch to U j1;
– otherwise, Di will stick to U j0.
In the jargon of the network literature, the number of links connecting D nodes to
a certain U node changes over time due to the changing price charged by the U firm
so that the topology of the network is also in a process of continuous evolution. The
total number of nodes, however, is constant.
The preferred-partner choice rule applies also to the relationship between firms
(both D and U) and banks. At time t = 1 the links among firms and banks are
established at random. For instance, firm Di ends up linked to the bank z0 (Bz0).
Afterwards, with probability 1 − ε each firm looks at the interest rate charged by
a randomly selected number—say N—of banks. If the minimum observed interest
rate—say the one charged by Bz1—is lower than the one charged by Bz0, then Di
will switch to Bz1; otherwise, he will stick to Bz0.
Suppose that Di belonging to j0 goes bankrupt. The demand of intermediate
goods produced by U j0 goes down and so do revenues, profits and net worth. The
interest rate r j0zt = σ A−σzt + θ
(
l j0t
)θ goes up. Therefore also U j0 can go bankrupt.
In principle there can be negative repercussions also on other D firms belonging to
j0 which cannot produce as much as they want, due to the bankruptcy of their sup-
plier U j0. An avalanche of bankruptcies will follow due to the positive feedback of
the bankruptcy of a single agent on the net worth of the “neighbours”, linked to the
bankrupt agent by trade or credit links. Notice, however, that there is also a negative
feedback with a stabilizing effect due to the fact that the smaller net worth of the part
of D firms makes the leverage of U firms smaller and therefore it makes the interest
rate charged by the bank smaller.
The profit of the i th D firm is defined as follows: πi t = uit Yit − (1 + r izt )Bit −
(1 + r jt )Qit where uit is the price and Yit is the quantity of consumption goods, r izt
is the interest rate charged by Bz to Di , r jt is the interest rate on trade credit charged
by U j to Di and Qit is the amount of intermediate input that Di has bought from
U j . Upstream firms’ profit is equal to: π j t = (1 + r jt )Q jt − (1 + r jzt )B jt . Banks’
profit is equal to πzt = ∑i∈Iz (1 + r izt )Bit +
∑
j∈Jz (1 + r jzt )B jt , where Iz and Jz are,
respectively, the set of D and U firms interacting with bank z.9
At the end of the period, the net worth of the x th agent (x = i for downstream, j
for upstream, z for bank) is defined as follows
Axt+1 = Axt + πxt − B Dxt
where B Dxt is “bad debt”. In fact, if a borrower cannot pay back the loan obtained from
the lender and goes bankrupt, the lender has a “bad debt” (non-performing loan), that
is accounted for as a reduction of its net worth. The agent goes bankrupt if Axt+1 ≤ 0.
In our framework, the lenders are the U firms and the banks, while both types of
firms can be borrowers (if they are not self-financed).
9 Of course Iz ∪ Jz = z .
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In the case of U firms, “bad debt” is B D jt = (1+r jt )γ ∑i∈Bj Yit , i.e. the amount
of trade credit not reimbursed (intermediate goods not paid for) by bankrupt D cus-
tomers, which are grouped for convenience in the set Bj .





i.e. non-performing loans of bankrupt D and U firms, which are grouped for conve-
nience in the set Bz .
3 Simulation results
In this section, we analyze the dynamic properties of the credit network modelled
above, with a particular emphasis on the amplitude and length of bankruptcy ava-
lanches. We perform computer simulations of an economy consisting of I = 500 D
firms, J = 250 U firms and Z = 100 banks over a time span of T = 1,000 periods.
There are 12 parameters in the model, which are set as follows: φ = 1.2, β = 0.8,
δd = 0.5, δu = 1, γ = 0.5, α = 0.1, σ = 0.1, θ = 0.05, w = 1, M = 5, N = 5,
ε = 0.01.
The net worth of agents (firms and banks) at the beginning of the time span (t = 1)
is set to 1. We assume a simple mechanism of entry-exit: bankrupt firms/banks are
replaced with new entrants on the basis of a one-to-one replacement. New agents are
endowed with an initial amount of net worth drawn from a uniform distribution with
mean 1 and finite variance.10
Figure 1 shows some relevant aspects emerging from the simulation of the credit
network. Panel (a) shows the fluctuating behavior of the D aggregate production. The
U aggregate production follows the same dynamic pattern since U suppliers produce
intermediate goods for D production “on demand”. Panel (b) shows that, over time,
a power law distribution of firms’ size emerges, according to the empirical evidence
on firm size distribution (Axtell 2001; Gaffeo et al. 2003). Accordingly, starting from
identical initial conditions, firms become rapidly heterogeneous11 In addition, the
distribution of the number of links for each lender (U firm or bank) becomes asym-
metric over time due to the preferred-partner choice rule governing the interaction
among borrowers and lenders. In other words, the actual degree distribution of the
credit network suggests that some lenders, in the right tail of the distribution, have a
number of customers higher than that generated by a normal distribution. This holds
true for the number of commercial credit relationships between D and U firms (panel
(c)), as well as for the number of connections between firms and banks (panel (d)).
The length of credit relationships is endogenously determined by the preferred-
partner choice rule. In particular, the average length of the D–U link across 100
Monte Carlo simulations of the model is equal to 1.4; in the case of the D–B link the
10 For the sake of simplicity, the total number of agents in the economy is constant over time. In order to
avoid capital coutercyclicality, when new agents replace bankrupt ones, the initial endowment of capital
for entrants is “small” with respect to other agents or the average net worth.
11 Each D firms is hit by a price shock in each time period because the sale price is stochastic. Therefore
the accumulation of net worth on the part of each D firm rapidly takes different routes. The accumulation
of net worth on the part of U firms and banks is determined as a consequence.
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Fig. 1 a Aggregate production of downstream firms. b Firm size distribution (in terms of net worth).
c Degree distribution of the network: downstream versus upstream firms. d Degree distribution of the
network: firms versus banks
average length is equal to 4.7; instead, the average length of the U–B link is equal
to 18.9. The higher stability of relationships depends on the different bankruptcy rate
characterizing different agents, decreasing from D to U and B sectors.
Lenders with a high number of links are less vulnerable to bankruptcy because
they are also financially sound and can supply credit at better conditions. Financially
sound U firms set lower prices than financially fragile ones, attract more D firms, are
more profitable and further increase their financial robustness.The opposite is true for
financially fragile U firms. The corporate U sector becomes polarized and the degree
distribution becomes asymmetric. A positive feedback occurs.
In a similar way, financially sound banks set lower prices than financially fragile
ones, attract more firms, are more profitable and further increase their financial robust-
ness. The opposite is true for financially fragile banks. The banking sector becomes
polarized and the degree distribution becomes asymmetric.
All in all, the attachment operating through the choice of partners by lower prices
and interest rates increases the number of links of financially sound firms and banks
(in this way they can offer lower prices and interest rates also in the following periods)
that improve their financial positions, increasing the “robustness” of the network. On
the other hand, the evolution of a scale invariant degree distribution increases also the
“vulnerability” of the network because the default of a highly connected agent can
have serious consequences on the stability of the networks generating an avalanche of
bankruptcies.
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The default of an agent can generate a diffusion of bankruptcies across the network.
Figure 2 provides a simple graphical representation of what can happen in the credit
network economy as a consequence of the default of one or more firms. Consider
a small part of the network involving downstream firms from D1 to D7, upstream
firms U1, U2 and U3, and banks B1 and B2. Suppose that, for instance, downstream
firms D4, D6 and D7 go bankrupt due to idiosyncratic (price) shocks. These firms do
not fulfill debt commitments. As a consequence, the financial conditions of lenders
deteriorate due to bad loans. In the case described in Fig. 2, U2 and B1 go bankrupt,
while U1 and B2 survive to the failure of their partners. Accordingly, the channel of
bankruptcy propagation is the following: the failure of D4 and D6 provokes the default
of U2; the failure of D6, D7 and U2 provokes the default of B1. Although U1 and B2
survive to their partners’ default, the deterioration of their financial conditions, due to
bad loans incidence on balance sheets, produce an increase of the interest rate (charged
on their old and new partners) increasing the likelihood of additional failures. As a
result, our model demonstrates that “the high rate of bankruptcy is a cause of the high
interest rate as much as a consequence of it” (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003, p. 145).
The seriousness of agents’ defaults with respect to bankruptcy avalanches and busi-
ness fluctuations depends on the size of agents and their connectivity. In fact, even a
high number of bankruptcies can be absorbed by the system without generating a dom-
ino effect. Accordingly, the extent of bankruptcy events depends also on the amount
of bad debts.
Figure 3 displays the time evolution of the aggregate bad debt: it emerges that it
is more likely to observe “large” amounts of bad debt in sequence. This is in line
with the above description of the bankruptcy diffusion mechanism: agents’ failures
provoke financial distress with a deterioration of credit conditions, due to the increase
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Fig. 3 Aggregate bad debt: time evolution
of interest rates, producing additional failures and large amounts of bad debt, until the
return of “normal conditions” in the credit network economy.
In order to examine the incidence of extreme events on the credit network evolu-
tion, we compute the variable B D′, that is the absolute value of the difference between
aggregate bad debt and its median. After that, we calculate the probability of observing
values of B D′ larger than xσB D , where σB D is the standard deviation of aggregate bad
debt and x is a positive parameter. Figure 4 shows that extreme events, with a “high”
value of x , have a positive, even if “low”, probability of realization.
Another relevant aspect is the length of bankruptcy chains. In order to examine
this aspect, we calculate the number of periods characterized by “large” amount of
bad debt: in particular, for each period we control if B D′ is larger than 2σB D . The
credit network economy under scrutiny verifies this conditions in 52 periods. We
also compute the realization of a random process with the same average probability
(52/1,000) of verifying the conditions B D′ > 2σB D . Figure 5 clearly shows that the
credit network economy is characterized by the clustering of “large bad debt” events,
according to which said above, a feature not displayed by a random process.
Finally, the occurrence of bankruptcy crises amplifies business fluctuations and, as
a consequence, the distribution of aggregate growth rates is far from being Gaussian,
showing instead a double exponential behavior (Bottazzi and Secchi 2003; Stanley
et al. 1996) with a noticeable asymmetry for negative events (see Fig. 6).
4 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed the properties of a credit-network economy characterized by inside
credit (i.e. credit relationships connecting agents belonging to different groups of
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Fig. 4 Aggregate bad debt: probability of extreme events



























the same sector, i.e. D firms and U firms) and outside credit (i.e. credit relationships
connecting agents belonging to different sectors, i.e. firms and banks).
The configuration of productive and credit interlinkages changes over time due
to the preferred-partner choice rule, which implies that endogenous changes of the
interest rate on trade credit and on bank loans affect the number of clients of each
U firm and each bank. This rule is reminiscent of the preferential attachment rule
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Fig. 6 The distribution of aggregate growth rates
(Barabàsi and Albert 1999) and it is based on a mechanism similar to the fitness model
(Bianconi and Barabàsi 2001) already adopted in the network literature. The chang-
ing topology of the network affects the propagation of bankruptcies and the shape of
business fluctuations.
The borrower’s net worth is a proxy of creditworthiness. Hence credit extended
is increasing with the borrowers’ net worth. Since D output—which consists of con-
sumption goods—is constrained only by the availability of funds, in the end, the supply
of consumption goods is increasing with D net worth. The net worth of D firms turns
out to be the driver of growth and fluctuations. U production, in fact, is determined
by demand of intermediate inputs on the part of D firms. Changes in the D net worth,
therefore, yield changes in the same direction of U production. Also banks are involved
because the interest rate that a bank charges is a function of borrowers’ net worth.
If a D firm goes bankrupt, not only the supply chain can be disrupted—involving U
firms—but also an interest rate hike can follow due to the change in attitude of lenders.
More bankruptcies will follow in a bankruptcy avalanche.
The output of simulations shows that a business cycle at the macroeconomic level
can develop as a consequence of the complex interaction of the financial conditions
of the agents involved. We can also reproduce the main facts of firms’ demography:
power law distribution of firms’ size and Laplace ditribution of growth rates. The pre-
ferred choice rule affects essentially the skewness of the firms’size distribution and of
the degree distribution of the network.
There are obvious restrictions on the conditions determining the model environment
which we plan to relax in the future. An interesting extension is the introduction of an
interbank market, which will allow modelling the central bank and monetary policy.
In addition, we would like to extend the preferred choice rule also to the goods and
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labour markets. This will imply a more sophisticated design of households’ behaviour,
which so far has been essentially passive. Our aim is then to further investigate the
interplay between the formation of credit interlinkages and macroeconomic dynamics
by extending our model in different directions, towards a “complete” credit network.
Acknowledgments We are grateful for insightful comments and criticisms to participants to the East-
ern Economic Association meeting, New York City, February 2007—in particular Duncan Foley, whose
detailed comments have been expecially useful-, the Net-Work-shop at Catholic University in Milan, April
2007, the XLVIII Annual Meeting of the Italian Economists Society in Turin, October 2007. Last but not
least, thanks to the participants to the ESHIA/WEHIA 2008, Warsaw, June 19–21, and, in particular, to
Pedro Campos and Paul Ormerod for very useful suggestions. We are grateful to the referees for their
insightful comments and criticisms.
References
Allen F, Gale D (2000) Financial contagion. J Polit Econ 108:1–33
Axtell R (2001) Zipf distribution of U.S. firm sizes. Science 293:1818–1820
Bak P, Chen K, Scheinkman J, Woodford M (1993) Aggregate fluctuations from independent sectoral
shocks: Self-organized criticality in a model of production and inventory dynamics. Ricerche Eco-
nomiche 47(1):3–30
Barabàsi A-L, Albert R (1999) Emergence of scaling in random networks. Nature 286:509–512
Battiston S, Delli Gatti D, Gallegati M, Greenwald B, Stiglitz J (2007) Credit chains and bankruptcy ava-
lanches in supply networks. J Econ Dyn Control 31(6):2061–2084
Bernanke B, Gertler M (1989) Agency costs, net worth and business fluctuations. Am Econ Rev 79:14–31
Bernanke B, Gertler M (1990) Financial fragility and economic performance. Q J Econ 105:87–114
Bernanke B, Gertler M, Gilchrist S (1999) The financial accelerator in quantitative business cycle frame-
work. In: Taylor J, Woodford M (eds) Handbook of macroeconomics, vol 1C. North-Holland,
Amsterdam
Bianconi G, Barabàsi A-L (2001) Competition and multiscaling in evolving networks. Europhys Lett
54(4):436–442
Boissay F (2006) Credit chains and the propagation of financial distress. ECB Working Paper No. 573
Bottazzi G, Secchi A (2003) Why are distributions of firm growth rates tent-shaped? Econ Lett 80:415–420
Delli Gatti D, Gallegati M, Greenwald B, Russo A, Stiglitz J (2006) Business fluctuations in a credit-network
economy. Phys A 370:68–74
Freixas X, Parigi B, Rochet J (2000) Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision. J Money
Credit Bank 32:611–638
Furfine C (2003) Interbank exposures: quantifying the risk of contagion. J Money Credit Bank 35(1):111–
128
Gaffeo E, Gallegati M, Palestrini A (2003) On the size distribution of firms: additional evidence from the
G7 countries. Phys A 324:117–123
Gertler M, Gilchrist S (1993) The role of credit market imperfections in the monetary transmission mech-
anism. Scand J Econ 95(1):43–64
Goyal S (2007) Connections. Princeton University Press, New Jersey
Greenwald B, Stiglitz J (1993) Financial market imperfections and business cycles. Q J Econ 108:77–114
Iori G, Jafarey S, Padilla F (2006) Systemic risk on the interbank market. J Econ Behav Organ 61(4):525–
540
Jackson M (2005) The economics of social networks. In: Blundell R, Newey W, Persson T (eds) Proceedings
of the ninth world congress of the Econometric Society. Cambridge University Press, London
Jackson M (2008) Social and economic Networks. Princeton University Press, New Jersey
Jaffee D, Stiglitz JE (1990) Credit rationing. In: Friedman BM, Hahn FH (eds) Handbook of monetary
economics, edn 1, vol 2, chap 16. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 837–888
Mateut S (2001) Trade credit and monetary policy transmission. J Econ Surv 19(4):655–670
Mateut S, Mizen P (2003) Trade credit and bank lending: An investigation in the determinants of UK
manufacturing firms access to trade credit. Working Paper No. 2003/3. European University Institute
123
212 D. Delli Gatti et al.
Nadiri MI (1969) The determinants of trade credit in the US total manufacturing sector. Econometrica
37(3):408–423
Nier E, Yang J, Yorulmazer T, Alentorn A (2007) Network models and financial stability. J Econ Dyn
Control 31:2033–2060
Nilsen J (2002) Trade credit and the bank lending channel. J Money Credit Bank 34:227–253
Stanley M, Amaral L, Buldyrev S, Havlin S, Leschorn H, Maas P, Salinger M, Stanley E (1996) Scaling
behavior in the growth of companies. Nature 379:804–806
Stiglitz J, Greenwald G (2003) Towards a new paradigm in monetary economics. Cambridge University
Press, London
Summers B, Wilson N (2001) Trade credit and customer relationships. University of Leeds, Credit Man-
agement Research Center, Mimeo
Vega-Redondo F (2007) Complex social networks. Econometric society monograph series. Cambridge
University Press, London
123
